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RECENT DECISIONS
luggage therefore does not make out a prima facie case. 2 However,
where the.. passenger's property is taken by the company into its
custody and control, a failure, refusal, or inability to return same
on demand, established a prima facie case. 3 But the burden of
proof never leaves the plaintiff. If a prima facie case is made out,
the coming forward with proof shifts to defendant to show lack
of negligence and use of due care. 4 If the prima fade case is thus
rebutted, then plaintiff must show by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that defendant was negligent. 5
The Court in the case at bar distinguished between this case
and Sneddon v. Payne 6 in that in the latter case, "the plaintiff
handed his bag to a 'red cap' porter not in the employ of the
defendant." 7
V. G. R.

BANKING LAW-CORPORATION MERGER-LIABILITY TO DisSENTING STOcCHOLDER.-In 1932 the -Chatham National Bank and

Trust Co. merged with the Manufacturers Trust Co., the respondents in this proceeding. At a meeting held prior to the merger,
the appellant, a stockholder in the surviving corporation, had voiced
his objection and demanded appraisal of and payment for his stock
by virtue of the Banking Law, §496. This denied, he brought suit
to enforce his claim, but the Supreme Court and the Appellate
Division' similarly overruled the plaintiff's contention and held that
the section applied only to the dissenting stockholders of the corporation being merged and not to those of the merging corporation.
On appeal, held, Section 496 of the Banking Law (Laws of 1914,
c. 369) applies to the dissenting stockholders of both or all the
corporations involved in the merger. Matter of Cantor, 261 N. Y.
6; 184 N. E. 474 (1933).
'Carpenter v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., supra note 1; Cohen v. N. Y.
Cent. etc. R. Co., 121 App. Div. 5, 105 N. Y. Supp. 483 (4th Dept. 1907);
Weingart v. Pullman Co., 58 Misc. 187, 108 N. Y. Supp. 972 (1908).
'Goldstein v. Pullman Co., supra note 1; Croll v. Pullman Co., 61 Misc.
265, 113 N. Y. Supp. 542 (1908); Sherman v. Pullman Co., 79 Misc. 52, 139
N. Y. Supp. 51 (1913); Holden v. Davis, 119 Misc. 492, 196 N. Y. Supp. 552

(1922) ; Irving v. Pullman Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 248 (1903).
'Carpenter v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., supra note 1; Van Dike v.

Pullman Co., instant case.
r Ibid.
" Sneddon v. Payne, supra note 1. In this case a station porter took plaintiff's bag into the Pullman car while plaintiff was delayed outside about two
minutes in order to have his ticket inspected. On entering, his bag was missing.
Held, defendant not liable without proof of negligence.
7Van Dike v. Pullman Co., instant case, at 460, 260 N. Y. Supp. at 301.

1Matter of Cantor, 236 App. Div. 356, 258 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1st Dept.
1932).
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Section 496 states: "Any stockholder or shareholder not voting
in favor of such agreement of merger at a meeting prescribed by
§490 of this article, may at such meeting or within twenty days
thereafter object to the merger and demand payment for his stock
or shares. * * * If the merger takes effect at any time after such
demand, such stockholder or shareholder may, at any time within
sixty days apply to the Supreme Court * * *."
Section 490 provides for the submission of the merger agreement to the stockholders of "each" corporation at a meeting thereto
to be called upon notice, and in the event of failure of at least twothirds of the stockholders of "each" of the merging corporations to
approve the merger, the transaction fails. If the approval of twothirds of the stockholders of "each" corporation is obtained, the plan
becomes operative, but the dissenting stockholders of "each" corporation have a right to an appraisal of their stock and payment therefor.2- Section 496 (supra) in speaking of §490 (supra) says a
dissenting stockholder within twenty days thereafter may object * * *
etc., obviously intending the dissenting stockholders of "each" corporation if both these statutes are to be read together. 3 The statute
was enacted to protect dissenting stockholders of both corporations
to the merger. If it had been the intention of the legislature to
limit protection to the dissenting stockholders of the merged cor-4
poration, it would have been a simple matter to have so provided.
The rights and obligations of a corporation which continues
in existence after a merger remain as before unless changed by
legislative enactment, whereas the rights and obligations of the corporation which after the merger ceases to exist can continue only
if transferred to the surviving corporation.5 A corporation which
continues in existence after a merger may have a new name, new
directors and officers, and new by-laws; and there is nothing in the
bank laws precluding the merging corporations from providing by
the merger agreement that the name, directors, and by-laws shall
be those of the corporation which in form has been absorbed by
the surviving corporation. 6 In so far as the right of a corporation
to exist is concerned as well as the exercise of such powers as can
only be exercised by it as an existing corporation, the state has
absolute control under its reservatory provision. 7 It is within this
power that the Legislature allows corporations to merge with other
'corporations even at the expense of dissenting stockholders. 8
'N. Y.

BANKING LAW (1914) §490 (amended Laws of 1928, c. 298).
'Supra note 1. Dissenting opinion per Martin, J.
'Ibid.
'Instant case.
'Matter of Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912).
"N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW (1909) §5.
'Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. Supp. 978
(1st Dept. 1908), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 535, 84 N. E. 1111 (1908).
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The right of dissenting stockholders to payment, created by the
Legislature, cannot upon any ground of assumed public policy be
limited by the courts to the dissenting stockholders of the absorbed
corporation. It follows that the appellant, as a dissenting stockholder of the merging corporation was entitled to the relief
demanded.
S. B. S.
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BRFAcH.-Plaintiff is holder of fifteen-year gold bonds issued by
the defendant in 1925, providing for retirement by lot of bonds in
the sum of $5,000 every year from 1930 to 1939, at 105% of its
face value and accrued interest. Defendant failed to pay interest
or retire any bonds in 1930 and 1931. Defendant was voluntarily
dissolved and taken over by a successor in 1928. Plaintiff brings
action for value of his bonds on ground of breach of contract.
Defendant contends that plaintiff can have no cause of action on
the bonds until 1940. Appellate Division affirmed a judgment for
plaintiff on the grounds of anticipatory breach and impossibility
of performance. On appeal, held, the failure to retire the bonds constituted a present breach of contract giving plaintiff an immediate
right of action. Hall v. Nassau Consumers Ice Company, 260 N. Y.
417, 183 N. E. 903 (1933).
A failure to perform some obligation or promise which is part
of the contract constitutes a breach thereof.' One of the rights
plaintiff paid for and which defendant obligated itself to perform
was the yearly retirement of bonds by lot.2 Upon defendant's failure to so perform a breach occurred and an immediate right of
action accrued to plaintiff therefore. 3 Where the contract is for
the payment of money only at a future time, there can be no anticipatory breach and no action can be maintained thereon until the
specified time has arrived, 4 unless it contains an acceleration clause.
It is not anticipatory where the alleged breach of the contract does
not precede the time of performance or actual tender.5 The time
for defendant to perform its obligations had passed. In the instant
'WILuSTON,
2

CONTRACTS

(1924) §1288.

Weinman v. Blake & Knowles Steam Pump Works, 156 App. Div. 168,
140 N. Y. Supp. 1085 (4th Dept. 1913).

aSupra note 1.

'Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 N. E. 584
(1906); Werner v. Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dept.
1915) ; Bauchle v. Bauchle, 185 App. Div. 590, 173 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1st Dept.

1918).

'Wester v. Casein Co. of America, 206 N. Y. 506, 514, 100 N. E. 488, 490

(1912).

